We present a new functional interpretation, based on a novel assignment of formulas. In contrast with Gödel's functional "Dialectica" interpretation, the new interpretation does not care for precise witnesses of existential statements, but only for bounds for them. New principles are supported by our interpretation, including (a version of) the FAN theorem, weak König's lemma and the lesser limited principle of omniscience. Conspicuous among these principles are also refutations of some laws of classical logic. Notwithstanding, we end up discussing some applications of the new interpretation to theories of classical arithmetic and analysis.
Introduction
In 1958 Kurt Gödel presented an interpretation of Heyting Arithmetic HA into a quantifier-free theory T in all finite types. The interpretation hinges on a particular assignment of formulas of the language of first-order arithmetic to quantifier-free formulas of the language of T. Gödel's so-called functional interpretation (a.k.a. Gödel's Dialectica interpretation, after the journal where it was published [9] ) interprets certain principles that are not intuitionistically acceptable showing, in effect, that these principles can be safely added to HA without thereby changing the provable Π 0 2 -sentences. The particular assignment defined by Gödel cares for precise witnesses of existential statements (and decides disjunctions). For some years now, Ulrich Kohlenbach has been urging a shift of attention from the obtaining of precise witnesses to the obtaining of bounds for the witnesses. One of the main advantages of working with the extraction of bounds is that the non-computable mathematical objects whose existence is claimed by various ineffective principles can sometimes be bounded by computable ones, and this opens the way to obtaining effective bounds for ∀∃ statements as long as these claims have the right logical form (see Subsection 7.1). The standard example is weak König's lemma. This principle states that every infinite binary tree has an infinite path, and it is ineffective in the sense that there are infinite recursive binary trees whose infinite branches are all non-recursive. It can be viewed as the logical counterpart of various ineffective analytical principles such as -the attainment of the maximum by a continuous function on [0,1], -every continuous function on [0,1] is uniformly continuous, -Heine/Borel theorem (in the sequential form), among many others (see [34] for a comprehensive list).
Another important benefit of extracting bounds (via the hereditary notion of bound known as majorizability [11] ) is the uniformity obtained on parameters which are themselves also bounded. For instance, a witness for a theorem having the form ∀f ∀g ≤ 1 f ∃nA(f, g, n) is a functional φ, depending on f and g, producing a natural number n (the relation ≤ 1 is the pointwise less than relation between functions of type 1, i.e. from N to N). However, if a bound on n is all that is required, then this bound will only depend on bounds for f and g provided that the functional φ is majorizable. In this case, the bound can be given independently of g and depending only on a bound for f .
In at least two important situations a bound can be transformed back into an actual witness, namely (I) when the range circumscribed by the bound is finite, and the relation under consideration is decidable. For instance, given a closed term t satisfying ∀n∃m ≤ t(n) A(n, m), A being a decidable relation, one can obtain, by bounded search, a new closed term q such that ∀n A(n, q(n)).
(II) when the relation under consideration is monotone in the witnessing argu-ment. For instance, if A(f ) is such that
then we easily get that ∃f ≤ 1 t A(f ) implies A(t), i.e. any bound is also a witness.
The latter observation -on the monotonicity of actual mathematical existence theorems -has paved the way to striking results in the analysis of mathematical proofs (e.g. [16, 24, 28] ). In [18] , Kohlenbach observed (see also the recent survey [27] ) that various numerically interesting theorems in analysis can be written in the form ∀x ∈ P ∀z ∈ K x ∃nA ∃ (x, z, n),
where P is a Polish space (complete separable metric space), K x is a family of compact Polish spaces, parametrized by elements of P , and A ∃ is an existential formula. When formalized in the language of arithmetic in all finite types, via the standard representation of Polish spaces, sentences of the kind (1) have the logical form
where t is a type 1 closed term of the formal language. In very general situations (even ineffective) proofs of theorems having the logical form (2) are guaranteed to provide a bound on n depending only on x (independent of z).
In more concrete terms, a systematic analysis of a proof of a theorem (2) is guaranteed to provide a closed term q and a proof of the stronger theorem ∀x 1 ∀z ≤ 1 t(x)∃n ≤ q(x) A ∃ (x, z, n).
If the formula A ∃ is monotone on n (as it is the case for a wide range of statements in functional analysis, cf. [27] ), one actually obtains a witness for n independent of z,
The analysis of mathematical proofs with the help of proof theoretic techniques, in search for concrete new information, has been dubbed proof mining. The established technique in proof mining was introduced by Ulrich Kohlenbach in [14, 18] , and has been applied with increasing virtuosity and efficiency by Kohlenbach and his students ever since. The technique is called monotone functional interpretation (henceforth abbreviated by m.f.i.) and the proof of its soundness theorem juxtaposes the Gödelian argument (which yields precise witnesses) with a majorization argument.
This paper introduces a new functional interpretation, the bounded functional interpretation (abbreviated b.f.i.). Whereas m.f.i. uses majorizability techniques at the outer level after the passage from the given formula to its Gödelian assignment, our interpretation is new in the sense that it defines a novel assignment of formulas which, in effect, always disregards precise witnesses, caring only for bounds for them. The new interpretation does not rely on the decidability of prime formulas, not even for the verification of the interpretation (as m.f.i. does). It also interprets new classical principles, conspicuously weak König's lemma. This should be compared with m.f.i.'s treatment of weak König's lemma, according to which the lemma is eliminated at the end of the analysis, not by the interpretation itself. At the same time, a version of the (intuitionistically acceptable) FAN theorem is interpreted by the b.f.i.:
where A is any formula, provided that we read the relation ≤ 1 intensionally (more on this below). This is a blatantly false principle in classical mathematics. Intuitionistic mathematics accepts it due to reasons of continuity: If one warrants intuitionistically the antecedent ∀g ≤ 1 f ∃nA(g, n), then the existential witnesses n must depend solely on finite initial segments of g, yielding in fact a continuous dependence of n by g. Since the functionals g range below a given f , compactness reasons (that can be put in intuitionistic clothes) yield a bound for the n's. Notwithstanding, it is not continuity that is responsible for the elimination of the FAN theorem by b.f.i.: It is majorizability! This was first observed in [15] in connection with the FAN rule (see also [21] and [26] , where closure under the FAN rule is obtained even for systems whose models must contain discontinuous functionals). Majorizability, as opposed to continuity, is also responsible for the elimination of the classically valid (but intuitionistically unacceptable) weak König's lemma. Finally, there is even a more radical departure of b.f.i. from Gödel's interpretation: The principles interpreted by Gödel's technique are all consistent with classical logic, whereas this is not the case for b.f.i. in the presence of a minimal amount of arithmetic (cf. Proposition 9).
Our treatment of the majorizability relation is a bit subtle. For reasons similar to the ones that prevent Gödel's Dialectica interpretation from interpreting full extensionality, we must not work with the extensional majorizability relation. Instead, we work with an intensional version thereof. With this intensional majorizability relation, the FAN theorem falls as a very particular case of an overarching bounded collection principle. The mark of our treatment of the intensional majorizability relation is the incorporation of a rule, instead of a corresponding axiom. The presence of this rule entails the failure of the deduction theorem which, according to received opinion (see, for instance, [36] ), is not attractive. We beg to differ from this judgment. The failure of the deduction theorem allows the emergence of the distinction between postulates and implicative assumptions, the former ones being placed on the left-hand side of the provability sign, while the latter ones on the right-hand side (what can be proved with implicative assumptions can be proved with postulates, but not vice-versa). There are indications that this distinction plays an important role in the analysis of ordinary theorems of mathematics, being therefore imbued of relevant mathematical meaning (see Kohlenbach's recent work [13] , particularly the discussions in section 3). These matters are far from being well understood, being in dire need of further study and clarification. Having said that, we leave them at this juncture.
Even though a detailed comparison between m.f.i. and b.f.i. is beyond the scope of the present paper, the use of b.f.i. in analyzing some theoretical applications arising from the work of Ulrich Kohlenbach has convinced us that b.f.i. sheds light on that work, explaining on principled reasons certain phenomena for which m.f.i. requires rather ad-hoc arguments. The theoretical applications of b.f.i. can be seen as vast generalizations of Parikh type results (cf. [32] ), in part obtained because b.f.i. automatically removes "ideal elements" from ineffective proofs (in modern parlance, b.f.i. is specially suited for obtaining conservation results).
Finally, we should point out that b.f.i. was conceived so that it would leave (intensional) bounded formulas unaffected by the interpretation and, in particular, would leave first-order bounded formulas unaffected, even in feasible settings. Therefore, b.f.i. (as opposed to m.f.i.) is tailored for the elimination of ideal elements from weak theories of arithmetic and analysis (cf. [7, 31] ). Nevertheless, this issue is not dealt with in the present paper and will have to await for another work.
In the next section, we introduce the basic system over which we define the new interpretation (Section 3). In Section 4, we enumerate some principles that are not provable in the basic setting but which have a trivial interpretation. These turn out to be precisely the principles that are needed for proving a characterization theorem for the b.f.i. In Sections 5 and 6 we extend the interpretation to classical and arithmetical systems, respectively. In the final sections, we study some theoretical applications of b.f.i. by giving simple interpretations of (a uniform version of) weak König's lemma and of various (non-standard) boundedness principles in classical mathematics. These applications are versions of (or stem from) original and exciting results proved earlier by Kohlenbach using m.f.i. ( [18, 19, 22] ).
Basic Framework
Let L ω ≤ be a language in all finite types (based on a given ground type 0) with a distinguished binary relation symbol ≤ 0 (infixing between terms of type 0) and distinguished constants m of type 0 (0 0) and z of type 0 (the constant z is needed to ensure that each finite type is inhabited by at least one closed term). The theory IL ω ≤ is intuitionistic logic in all finite types (see [1] for the formalization we will be using) with axioms stating that ≤ 0 is reflexive, transitive, and with the axioms
Our treatment of equality is based on the minimal alternative described by Troelstra in the end of section 3.1 and the beginning of section 3.3 of [36] . There is a symbol of equality only for terms of type 0. Its axioms are
where φ is an atomic formula with a distinguished type 0 variable w. In order to characterize the behaviour of the logical constants (combinators) Π and Σ, we must also add
where φ is a an atomic formula with a distinguished variable w, and x, y and z are variables of appropriate type.
In the language L ω ≤ we can define Bezem's strong majorizability relation [2] (a modification of Howard's hereditary majorizability relation [11] that, as opposed to Howard's, is provably transitive -a necessity for our interpretation) and prove its main properties. We write ≤ * ρ for Bezem's strong majorizability relation for type ρ. This relation is defined by induction on the types:
The following is a result of [2] :
Proof. The type 0 case for (i) is due to the reflexivity of ≤ 0 , while the type non-zero cases follow directly from the definition. Property (ii) is proved by induction on the type. The type 0 case is given. We now must argue for xu ≤ * σ zv and zu ≤ * σ zv under the hypothesis that x ≤ * ρ σ y, y ≤ * ρ σ z and u ≤ * ρ v. We get immediately that xu ≤ * σ yv. By (i), v ≤ * ρ v. Therefore, yv ≤ * σ zv. By the induction hypothesis, xu ≤ * σ zv. The other property follows from the fact that, according to (i), z ≤ * ρ σ z. P In order to formulate the new functional interpretation, we introduce an extension L ω ¢ of the language L ω ≤ , obtained from the latter by the adjunction of new primitive binary relation symbols ¢ ρ , one for each type ρ (we use infix notation for these symbols). The relation ¢ ρ is the intensional counterpart of the extensional relation ≤ * ρ . The terms of L ω ¢ are the same as the terms of the original language L ω ≤ . Formulas of the form s ¢ ρ t, where s and t are terms of type ρ, are the new atomic formulas of the language. We also add, as a new syntactic device, bounded quantifiers, i.e. quantifications of the form ∀x ¢ tA(x) and ∃x ¢ tA(x), for terms t not containing x. Bounded formulas are those formulas in which every quantifier is bounded. 
with the restriction that x does not occur in t. There are also two further axioms
where s and t are terms of IL ω ¢ , A b is a bounded formula and u and v are variables that do not occur free in the conclusion.
Warning 1 As we will show in Proposition 8, the presence of the rule RL ¢ entails the failure of the Deduction Theorem for the arithmetical theories (here considered). We must use the rule instead of the corresponding implication (the converse of M 2 ) due to the fact that the implication does not have a bounded functional interpretation. A similar problem occurs with the treatment of full extensionality by the usual Gödel's functional interpretation, in which case the axiom must be replaced by a rule of extensionality (cf. [23] and [35] ).
The proof that we gave of Lemma 1 does not use the converse of the implication M 2 , only its weakened version given by the rule RL ¢ . This observation justifies the first two claims of the lemma below. The third claim is immediate.
Observation 1
The relation ≤ σ is the usual pointwise "less than or equal to" relation. It is the relation ≤ 0 for type 0, and x ≤ ρ σ y is defined recursively by ∀u ρ (xu ≤ σ yu).
Since the extended language L ω ¢ has new atomic formulas, we must check whether our axioms ensure that we have a decent theory of identity for all types. The following two propositions guarantee just that. Proof. It is enough to prove the above for atomic formulas φ. If the atomic formula is in the original language L ω ≤ , the result follows from E 2 . Let us now deal with the atomic formulas originating from the new relational symbols ¢ σ . We must show that, for every type σ, if r[w] and q[w] are terms of type σ with a distinguished type 0 variable w, then
We prove this by induction on the type σ. For the base type, use the axiom M 1 to reduce the ¢ 0 -inequation to an inequation with relation symbol ≤ 0 . By rule RL ¢ , in order to prove that
it is enough to prove the implication Proof. The usual proof of these facts for the ≤ * relation only uses the rule RL ¢ , not the unwarranted implication. For instance, to check that Σ ¢ Σ it is enough to prove (by several applications of rule RL ¢ ) the implication
By the above proposition, the consequent of the implication is equivalent to xy(xz) ¢ x y (x z ). This, in turn, is (under the antecedent of the implication) an easy consequence of M 2 . P
Majorizability Theories
In the following the reader should observe that the language L ω ¢ is allowed to include relational and constant symbols besides ≤ 0 , ¢ σ (σ a finite type), m and z.
If the constants of the language L ω ¢ are just m, z and the combinators Π and Σ, then Lemma 3 guarantees that IL ω ¢ is a majorizability theory. Later in the paper, we will associate majorizability theories to the theories of arithmetic
In a majorizability theory we define by induction on the type, a binary relation m ρ of type ρ (ρ ρ) according to the following clauses:
It is well known that the combinators Π and Σ enjoy the property of combinatorial completeness whereby, given any term t with a distinguished variable u, there is a term λu.t whose free variables are those of t except for u, such that (λu.t)(q) is (in the sense of allowing the pertinent substitutions of one term for the other) t[q/u]. We are using this fact in the above definition.
Proof. Firstly, we prove (ii) by induction on the type ρ. The base case is trivial. By rule RL ¢ (twice), in order to prove that m ρ σ ¢ m ρ σ it is enough to prove
In order to prove this, by rule RL ¢ (twice again), it is sufficient to prove
This follows from the induction hypothesis. Claim (i) is also proved by induction on the type. The base case is clear. We must now prove the implication whose antecedent is x ¢ ρ σ x ∧ y ¢ ρ σ y and whose consequent is x ¢ ρ σ m ρ σ (x, y) (the other conjunct is similar). By rule RL ¢ , it is sufficient to prove
The second conjunct of the consequent follows from part (ii) of the lemma. For the first conjunct, observe that xu ¢ σ xv and that, by induction hypothesis, xv ¢ σ m σ (xv, yv). Now use the transitivity of ¢ σ . P
The following result can be proven by an easy induction on the structure of terms. 
It is an easy consequence of Lemma 5 that every (open) term has a majorant. In the sequel, we shall often quantify over monotone functionals. We abbreviate the quantifications ∀f
The Bounded Functional Interpretation
In this section, we define a new functional interpretation (the Bounded Functional Interpretation) within IL If we have already interpretations for A and B given by∃b∀cA B (b, c) and
For bounded quantifiers we have:
And for unbounded quantifiers we define
In the above, it is understood that (∃xA) B is ∃x¢a∀c ¢cA B (b, c , x). Similarly for the other clauses. Note that the universal bounded quantifiers that occur in the clauses 3, 4, 6 and 8 are (as opposed to the others) restricted to monotone variables. The case of negation is a particular case of the implication. We get,
An inspection of the clauses of the definition of the bounded functional interpretation easily shows that
The following monotonicity property holds:
We are now ready to formulate and prove a soundness theorem for the bounded functional interpretation:
then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types such that
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation of A(z). Wherever convenient we shall build a term t containing also the variables a (the majorants of z), instead of a closed term which only at the end gets applied to a.
The axioms M 1 , M 2 and the equations characterizing the behaviour of the combinators are universal statements and it is to check that their interpretation is sound. Let us now consider an instance of the rule RL ¢ . Assume that the premise of the instance
has been derived (for the sake of simplicity, let z be the only parameter). By induction hypothesis, T ω ¢ proves that for all monotone a, c and d
which is equivalent to
By the rule RL ¢ we conclude
Let us now consider the axioms for bounded quantifiers. We assume that each of the bounded principles B ∀ and B ∃ is a shorthand for two separate principles: the left-to-right and the right-to-left implications.
and that z includes all the free variables of t (as mentioned in Notation 1 we will omit the underlining of tuples). Then
while the interpretation of the right hand side gives
The left-to-right implication asks for monotone terms q and r such that
Clearly, q(b, c, d) := c and r(b, d) := b do the job. For the right-to-left implication, we must find monotone terms q, s and r such that
It is easy to see that q(f, c) :
, wherẽ t and a are majorants for t and z respectively, do the job.
The left-to-right implication asks for monotone terms q, r and s such that
We just take q(b, c) := c, r(b) :=t[a/z] and s(b) := b, wheret and a are majorants for t and z respectively. For the right-to-left implication, we must find monotone terms q and r such that
It is easy to see that q(b, c, d) := c and r(b, d) := b do the job.
For the induction steps assume that (A) B is∃b∀cA B (b, c) and (B) B is∃d∀eB B (d, e) (we omit the free variables of A and B whenever not relevant).
By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms t, s and r such that
Let q := s(t). It is easy to see that∀eB B (q, e) follows from (i) and (ii), since, for a fixed e, (i) implies∀c ¢ r(t, e)A B (t, c) and (ii) implies∀c ¢ r(t, e)A B (t, c) → B B (s(t), e). Moreover, if s and t are monotone, then q is also monotone.
. By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms s and t such that
and monotone terms r, q such that
We have to produce monotone terms p and l satisfying
From (iii) and (iv) we have (v)∀e ¢ r(tb, v)B B (tb, e). From (ii) and (v) we get (by taking d := tb) C B (q(tb), v).
To interpret this axiom we must find monotone terms t, q 1 and q 2 such that
Clearly, the terms t and q i are monotone (see Lemma 4) . By the Monotonicity Property and Lemma 4, these terms do the job. 3b. A → A ∧ A. To interpret this axiom we must find monotone terms t 1 , t 2 and q such that c 2 ) . These terms will do. Note that the construction of the term q is canonical at this step, contrary to Gödel's interpretation where one is faced with a choice of terms.
. By induction hypothesis, there are monotone terms t and q such that
Let us compute the bounded functional interpretation of the conclusion of the rule. At first,
We must find monotone terms r, s, p and l such that for all monotone u, b, v and e,
We take r(u, b, v, e) := v, s(u, b, v, e) := t(b, e), p(u, b) := u and l(u, b) = q(b). These are clearly monotone terms. Let us verify that they do the job. Fix monotone u, b, v and e, and suppose that
In particular,
If the first disjunct holds, we are done. Suppose that the second disjunct is the case. Take any monotone e ¢ e. Clearly, if c ¢ tbe then c ¢ tbe. Hence, A B (b, c ). We have showed that,∀c ¢ tbe A B (b, c ). By (i), we get B B (qb, e ). By the arbitrariness of e , we are done.
. Just observe that the interpretation of A ∧ B → C asks for monotone terms t 1 , t 2 , s such that
while the conclusion of the rule asks for terms t 1 , t 2 , s such that
By induction hypothesis, we have monotone terms r, s such that
The interpretation of the conclusion of the rule asks for monotone terms t and q satisfying,
It is clear that we can take t := r and q := s.
∀xA(x) → A(t). For this axiom it is important to show all the free variables. The interpretation of
The soundness asks for monotone terms t, q, r such that for all g, c, a and z ¢ ã
Let t(g, c, a) :=t[a/z], q(g, c, a) := c and r(g, a) := g(t[a/z]), wheret is a term that majorizes t. It is easy to see that for all g, c, a and z ¢ ã
It is clear that t, q and r are monotone.
A(t) → ∃xA(x).
Here, it is also important to make explicit all the free variables. The axiom
and the soundness asks for monotone terms q, r and s such that for all b, c, a
It is also clear that q, r and s are monotone.
By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms r, s such that for all a, b, e and z ¢ ã
The interpretation of the conclusion of the rule asks for monotone terms t and q satisfying for all a, b, ẽ
It's clear that we can take t := r and q := s. P
The Interpretation at Work
Gödel's original interpretation [9] interprets certain principles, whose status goes beyond the intuitionistically acceptable (this was studied by M. Yasugi in [38] ; see sections 3.5.7-3.5.11 of [37] for an exposition of these matters).
The Bounded Functional Interpretation also interprets certain principles beyond those provable in IL ω ¢ . While some of these principles are related to the principles that are vindicated by Gödel's interpretation, others are completely new.
We finish the section with a Characterization Theorem for the bounded functional interpretation.
Interpretable Principles
As we will show, the following principles have a bounded functional interpretation:
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language L ω ¢ . The standard Axiom of Choice does not seem to be interpretable in general. Still, in Subsection 4.2 we will see that a monotone version of the Axiom of Choice is interpreted by the Bounded Functional Interpretation.
The Bounded Independence of Premises Principle
where A b is a bounded formula and B is an arbitrary formula.
The Bounded Markov's Principle
where A b and B b are bounded formulas. When B b is ⊥, with the help of some intuitionistic logic, we get the following useful version of the above principle:
, where A b is a bounded formula.
The Bounded Universal Disjunction Principle
where A b and B b are bounded formulas. There is no analogue of this principle in Gödel's functional interpretation. In a setting where bounded first-order formulas are decidable, this principle generalizes Bishop's lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (cf. [3] , but also [4] ) viz. that ∀x 0 , y 0 (A(x) ∨ B(y)) → ∀xA(x) ∨ ∀yB(y), where A(x) and B(y) are bounded first-order formulas.
The Bounded Contra Collection Principle
where A b is a bounded formula. This principle allows the conclusion of certain existentially bounded statements from the assumption of weakenings thereof (so-called -versions or -weakenings, in a terminology that Kohlenbach introduced in [14] regarding a more concrete situation -see also Section 7.1 below). As we shall discuss in Section 7, the Bounded Contra Collection Principle entails certain classical (non-constructive) principles related to weak König's lemma.
6. And finally, the Majorizability Axioms
We use bAC
where A is an arbitrary formula. (We use the acronym bBC ω [¢] for the aggregate of this principle over all types.) Observation 2 In the above, the formula A is arbitrary (in consonance with the FAN theorem). The Bounded Contra Collection Principle is (classically) the contrapositive of the Bounded Collection Principle, restricted to bounded matrices only. Note that the Bounded Contra Collection Principle is not intuitionistically acceptable, even for bounded matrices, ρ = 1 and τ = 0 (it entails weak König's lemma, as we shall see).
Proof. Let c monotone be fixed. Assume that
By bIP
Taking a := c, we get∃b∀z ¢ c∃y ¢ bA(y, z). P We have to show that there are monotone terms t and q, r 1 and r 2 such that, for all monotone f, g, a and c,
Let t(f, g) := f , q(f, g) := g, r 1 (f, g, a, c) = a, r 2 (f, g, a, c) := c and take f as f . The implication
follows due to the monotonicity property of the second entry of B, the monotonicity of g and the transitivity of ¢.
Let us now look at the interpretation of bIP
. Its premise has interpretation∃
while the interpretation of the conclusion is ¢ e B B (d, e , y) ) .
It is now easy to check that there are straightforward monotone terms (projections) that interpret the above principle.
We now study the interpretation of bMP ω bd [¢] . Its antecedent has interpretatioñ
while the interpretation of the conclusion is
Again, it is easy to check that there are suitable terms that interpret bMP which is also interpreted by the identity functional. P
The Characterization Theorem
In this section we show that the principles P[¢] are exactly the ones needed for proving the equivalence A ↔ (A) B , for arbitrary formulas A.
Proposition 4 (Monotone Axiom of Choice
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language L ω ¢ .
Proof. We argue the above for single variables, instead of tuples (the general case reduces to this one by induction on the number of variables). Assume the antecedent. In particular, we have
which implies, by the monotonicity of A, ∀a∃b(a ¢ a → A(a, b) ). By bAC → A(a , b) ).
By the monotonicity of A,∃f∀a∀a ¢ aA(a , f (a)) follows. We now conclude that∃f∀aA(a, f (a)). P Theorem 3 (Characterization) Let A be an arbitrary formula of L ω ¢ . Then
Proof 
The Negative Translation
We extend a version of the 'negative' translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic to the language L ω ¢ of bounded quantifiers, and show that the translation of some important principles are implied by the principles themselves (with the help of a form of Markov's principle and a stability condition). We use a 'negative' translation due to S. Kuroda [29] . This translation is defined in two steps. Firstly, it translates a formula A into a formula A † by maintaining unchanged atomic formulas, conjunctions, disjunctions, implications and existential quantifications and inserting a double negation after each universal quantification. The 'negative' translation A of A is, by definition, ¬¬A † . We extend this translation to the language L ω ¢ of the bounded quantifiers in the obvious way:
The Stability Axiom S is the statement ∀x 0 , y 0 (¬¬(x ¢ 0 y) → x ¢ 0 y). Note that this axiom holds in theories of arithmetic because in these theories the relation ≤ 0 is decidable. The Stability Axiom lifts to all types:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the type. The base case is the definition of S. We must show that IL ω ¢ + S ¬¬(x ¢ ρ σ y) → x ¢ ρ σ y. According to the rule RL ¢ , it is sufficient to show that IL for bounded formulas A (this restriction is denoted by bBC
Notation 2 The theory CL
ω ¢ is the classical version of IL ω ¢ , i.e., it is obtained from it by the adjunction of the law of excluded middle. In general, if T is a intuitionistic theory, CT denotes its classical counterpart.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of A. The axioms M 1 and M 2 are universal and, hence, their negative translations are consequences of themselves. In order to deal with the rule, the other axioms and the principles P bd [¢] observe, as a preliminary, that if A b is a bounded formula, then so is A † b . Let us now check the axioms for the bounded quantifiers. The negative translation of B ∀ is the double negation of
It is clear that the above follows (intuitionistically) from B ∀ itself. The case B ∃ is even simpler. Let us now study the behaviour of the rule RL ¢ under the negative translation. Suppose that the theory CL ω ¢ +P bd [¢] proves the premise (of an instance) of rule RL ¢ :
where A b is a bounded formula. By induction hypothesis, the theory IL
By intuitionistic logic and the lemma above, we obtain a derivation of
Clearly, the negative translation of a majorizability axiom ∀x∃y(x ¢ y) follows intuitionistically from itself. In the presence of the majorizability axioms, the Bounded Independence of Premises Principle and the Bounded Markov's Principle are classically true. We now show that IL
) . An instance of (bAC (x, y)) † . Using the transitivity of ¢, the following implication is intuitionistically valid:
This implies the consequent of ( * ), as wanted. In a similar vein, we can show that IL and G n A ω i,¢ (respectively). We prove some basic facts concerning these majorizability theories and see how they relate to the original ones.
Theories of Arithmetic
The theory HA ω is a version of Gödel's quantifier-free calculus T with quantifiers ranging over each finite type, with the axioms and rules of intuitionistic predicate logic and induction for all formulas of the new language. We keep, however, Troelstra's minimal treatment of equality as described in Section 2.
4
In HA ω , we can define the usual less than or equal numerical relation ≤ 0 , and the usual term max 0 (0 0) , giving the maximum of two numbers. Under HA ω , ≤ 0 is a reflexive and transitive relation and max satisfies the axioms A 1 and A 2 . We may suppose that ≤ 0 and max are primitive symbols of the language, and may take 0 as the distinguished type 0 constant (just add new constants ≤ 0 and m and adjoin universal numerical axioms characterizing them according to the usual definitions). 
is extended to all formulas of L ω ¢ (i.e., the new relation symbols ¢ may occur in A). 4 Troelstra denotes the theory with the minimal treatment of equality by HA ω 0 . For simplicity, we use the simpler notation, since other treatments of equality will not be discussed in this paper.
Observation 3 Note that, as part of the theory HA ω (and, hence, as part of the theory HA ω ¢ ), one has the following "equality" axioms for the recursors R,
where φ is an atomic formula of L ω ≤ with a distinguished variable w, and x, y and z are variables of appropriate type. Proposition 2 can be extended accordingly.
The following result is an adaptation of a result due to Howard in [11] :
Proposition 6 HA ω ¢ is a majorizability theory.
Proof. As discussed above, HA ω ¢ extends IL ω ¢ (where m is max). Clearly, the arithmetical constants 0 0 and S 1 are self-majorizing (one uses rule RL ¢ to check that S ¢ 1 S). It remains to see that the recursors R can be majorized (in the sense of ¢). The basic observation is that Howard's proof that the recursors can be majorized (in the sense of ≤ * ) only needs the rule RL ¢ , not the unwarranted implication. P
The intuitionistic theories of arithmetic G n A ω i (n ≥ 2) were introduced by Kohlenbach (see [19] ) in suitable languages of all finite types. They form a sequence of increasing strength, closely related to the levels of Grzegorczyk's hierarchy of primitive recursive functions (first defined in [10] ). These theories include: (a) a minimization functional µ b of type (0 1) 1 with (universal) axioms stating that µ b f 0 1 n 0 = 0 min 0 k ≤ 0 n(f nk = 0 0) if such a k ≤ 0 n exists, and = 0 0 otherwise; and (b) a maximization functional M of type 1 1 satisfying the equations M f 0 = 0 f 0 and M f (n + 1) = 0 max 0 (M f n, f (n + 1)). They also have suitable recursors meant to define functions by bounded "predicative" recursion. There are only two places in which we do not follow Kohlenbach. Firstly (and importantly), we do not include Spector's weak extensionality rule in these theories, 5 and opt instead for the minimal treatment of equality already discussed above. Secondly (although not essentially), in order to keep in tune with the usual presentation of arithmetical theories, we do not include in G n A ω i (n ≥ 2) all the true purely universal sentences ∀xA 0 (x), where x is a tuple of variables whose types have degree ≤ 2 (it is a known observation of G. Kreisel that the addition of true universal sentences does not have any effect on the bounds extracted -see Subsection 7.1 for a gener-alization of this observation). Due to this last modification, we must explicitly include in the theories G n A ω i (n ≥ 2) the axiom of quantifier-free induction:
The theory PRA ω i is obtained from the union of the theories G n A ω i (n ≥ 2) by adding the "predicative" recursorsR σ due to Kleene (see [1] for a description of these recursors). It remains to see that the scheme of unrestricted induction can be interpreted in HA ω ¢ . It is easier to verify the equivalent induction rule. Let (A(x)) B be 6 Except for the treatment of equality, PRA ω i is the theory restricted -Ẑ ω i of Solomon Feferman in [6] . This theory is also denoted by HA ω in the literature. Charles Parsons' quantifier-free theory T 0 (see [33] ) is an earlier version of these theories. Notice that (ii) implies
By (i) and (iii), the scheme of induction and the monotonicity of A B on the first argument, we get
where Φ(a) = Ψ(a, a), and Ψ(x, a) is the iteration functional defined according to the following recursive clauses:
Note that Φ is monotone (by the scheme of induction) and, hence, so is Ψ. P
Two distinctive facts
The next result shows that the presence of the rule RL ¢ (and a minimal amount of arithmetic) entails the failure of the deduction theorem:
Proof. If the deduction theorem were valid for T ω ¢ one could prove
By the soundness theorem we would have a term t satisfying
Let f * = g * = 1 and k = t11. We get
Let f be constant zero function up to k and one otherwise, whereas g is one up to k and zero otherwise. Using rule RL ¢ it is easy to show in T ω ¢ that f ¢ 1 and g ¢1. We can also prove the premise of the implication above in T ω ¢ , which would entail T ω ¢ f ¢ g. This implies, however,
Clearly a contradiction given the way f and g are defined. P Intuitionistic mathematics accepts some results which the classical mathematician rejects, e.g. some versions of the FAN theorem (see [5] for a recent introduction to intuitionistic mathematics). The derivation of the non-classical FAN theorem within intuitionistic mathematics relies upon continuity principles peculiar to the intuitionistic philosophy of the continuum. From these continuity principles, one can obtain refutations of laws of classical logic. Although b.f.i. bypasses the intuitionistic principles of continuity via majorizability (as we have already observed in the introduction) it vindicates a very general form of the FAN theorem. It so happens that this general form already refutes laws of classical logic (this seems to be a folklore result). We show next that this folklore result can be formalized in the theory interpretable by b.f.i., via the minimal amount of Markov principle available there, which implies that b.f.i. is sound for classically false principles. 
This is clearly a contradiction: Just consider the function x 1 which has the value zero for the natural numbers up to k and is equal to one afterwards (note that T ω ¢ proves that x ¢ 1 1). P Using the terminology of Errett Bishop in [3] , the theory interpretable by b.f.i. refutes the principle of limited omniscience LPO but, according to the results of Section 4.1, proves the lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO).
Towards Applications
In this subsection, we go through some basic assorted facts that are needed for the applications.
Lemma 8
The following are derivable in G 2 A ω i,¢ :
In the above, min 0 is the usual minimum function of the natural number system, whereas min ρ σ (x, y) is λu ρ . min σ (xu, yu).
Observation 5
Instead of M f we usually write f M . With this notation, property 2 above becomes f ¢ f M .
Proof. We just have to be careful and make sure that we use the rule RL ¢ , not the unwarranted implication ∀u,
This, on the other hand, follows (again by RL ¢ ) from the provability of the
The other claims of the lemma are also easy. For instance, the last claim is proved by induction on the types. The base case is trivial. The conditional
follows from the provability of
This holds because, under the antecedent, the induction hypothesis yields min σ (xu, yu) ¢ σ zv. P Definition 7 Let i, j ∈ {0, 1}. By the acronym bAC i,j 0 we mean the following bounded choice principle:
where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula.
Proof. We argue for bAC A 0 (x, y) . Pick such a Φ 1 1 . Given x 1 , put a 1 as x M and use part (ii) of Lemma 8 and part (iii) of Lemma 2, to obtain the desired conclusion. P For i, j ∈ {0, 1}, the usual quantifier-free choice principle AC i,j 0 is
where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula. In virtue of the existence of the minimization functional µ b , it is clear that bAC
Theories of arithmetic satisfy the Stability Axiom (they even decide x ≤ 0 y).
The corollary below is a consequence of Proposition 5 together with the fact that the theories considered are closed under the negative translation:
Each of the theories of arithmetic T ω that we are considering was extended by a corresponding majorizability theory T 
The following result is clear:
, and let A(z) be an arbitrary formula of L ω ¢ , with its free variables as displayed. We have:
Notice that (as remarked in Warning 2) the amount of induction available in theories with restricted induction must remain the same when the extension to the language L ω ¢ is made. This is essential for Proposition 11 to hold, since via the transformation (·) * , the prime formulas ¢ become formulas of high complexity. This is no problem, however, for theories already containing unrestricted induction as HA ω .
7 Application: Interpreting UWKL Weak König's Lemma, WKL for short, is the well-known principle saying that every infinite tree of finite sequences of 0's and 1's has an infinite path. We formalize this axiom as follows:
where we are using the notation of [1] . This notation is explained swiftly. Given
tree is a functional of type 1 so that, for any s 0 ,
where s ∈ {0, 1} <ω means that s is (the code of) a binary sequence, and q ⊆ s means that q is (the code of) an initial sequence of s. The functional f tree itself is obtained from f by pruning away extraneous sequences (formally, λf 1 .f tree is a functional of type 1 1). The expression s ∈ {0, 1} k means that s is (the code of) a binary sequence of length k (note that the quantification ∃s ∈ {0, 1} k (. . .) is first-order bounded). Finally, given k 0 and x 1 , x(k) is the (code of the) sequence x(0), x(1), . . . , x(k − 1) . Uniform weak König's lemma (first introduced in [26] , def. 2.3), UWKL for short, is the following strengthening of weak König's lemma 7 :
Lemma 9
The following are derivable in
, whereŝ is the functional of type 1 with the same values as the binary sequence s up to its length, and zero otherwise (in case s / ∈ {0, 1} <ω , s is constantly zero).
Notation 3
The '1' on the right-hand side of '¢ 1 ' denotes the constant functional λn 0 .1 0 .
Observation 6 Formally, λs.ŝ is a functional of type 0 1.
Proof. We argue (ii) (part (i) is similar). According to rule RL ¢ , in order to prove thatŝ ¢ 1 1, it is enough to prove the implication u ≤ 0 v →ŝ(u) ≤ 0 1. This is clear by the definition ofŝ. P
Proof. Let Bounded(f 1 , k 0 ) abbreviate ∀s ∈ {0, 1} k f (s) = 0 0. UWKL is the following principle:
It is clear that UWKL entails UWKL. We show that
where 1
The proof of the claim follows closely an argument of Avigad and Feferman in [1] . Take an arbitrary k 0 . Define φ 1 0 as follows: Given g 1 , if the empty sequence is not in g 1 (i.e., g applied to the code of is not zero), let φg be (the code of) ; if not, consider the greatest length < k + 1 for which there is a sequence s ∈ {0, 1} such that g tree (s) = 0, and take φg to be (say) the leftmost such sequence. Define Φ 1 1 g := φg. By (ii) of the previous lemma, it is easy to argue that Φ ¢ 1 1 1. Let g 1 be given. It does not take much reflection to conclude that
The claim follows. Using (i) of the previous lemma and the facts that (g tree ) tree and g tree , and Φg and Φg tree are equal pointwise, the claim can be restated thus:
, we get UWKL . P Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 below are similar to Theorem 4.8 of [14] and Theorem 3.2 of [26] .
Theorem 5 Let T ω be one of the theories HA ω , PRA
where τ and ρ are arbitrary types and A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its free variables as displayed), then there is a closed monotone term q τ ρ such that
Proof. Suppose that CT ω + bAC
. By Proposition 10 and the previous lemma, CT
, we get
By the Soundness Theorem (Arithmetical Extension) and Proposition 11, there is a closed monotone term q τ ρ such that,
The result follows. P Corollary 2 Let T ω be one of the theories
, where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its free variables as displayed), then there is a closed term t 1 such that T ω ∀x 0 A(x, tx).
Proof. We follow the proof of the previous theorem until (++). In our case, by letting a 0 be x 0 , we get T The following result is essentially due to Kleene [12] (see [1] for an exposition): There is a natural translation of type 0 terms t of the language of PRA ω i whose only free variables are of type 0 to terms t P RA of the language of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA, such that if PRA ω i t = q, then PRA t P RA = q P RA . The discussion of this paragraph, together with the corollary above, yields the following result of Harvey Friedman (1976, unpublished) :
, where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its variables as displayed) and n and m are numerical variables, then there is a functional symbol f of the language of PRA such that PRA ∀nA 0 (n, f (n)). Ulrich Kohlenbach has been calling attention to the importance (for applications) of the extraction of bounds for consequences having the general form ∀x 1 ∀z ≤ σ sx∃y ρ A 0 (x, y, z), where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula, ρ ≤ 2 and σ arbitrary (the special case σ = 1, ρ = 0 is the most important case for applications). Here follows a result based on section 3 of [18] :
, where ρ ≤ 2, s 1 σ is a closed term, and A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its free variables as displayed), then there is a closed monotone term t such that
a strengthening of ∆ w (obtained by a partial Skolemization of the sentences thereof). This strengthening seems to be necessary due to the fact that m.f.i. interprets (even in a classical context) the axiom of quantifier-free choice for arbitrary types. In our context, however, where only restricted forms of choice can be handled, ∆ w is all that is needed for the verification:
Theorem 6 Let T ω be one of the theories HA ω , PRA
where τ and ρ are arbitrary types, A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its free variables as displayed), and ∆ is a class of sentences as described above. Then there is a closed monotone term q τ ρ such that
where ∆ w is the weakening of ∆ described above.
Proof. Taker such that T 
, each of these sentences implies, in turn, the corresponding one in ∆. Therefore,
Since each sentence of ∆ ¢ implies its negative translation, we get
It is clear that the bounded functional interpretations of the sentences in ∆ ¢ are of the form∀F , with F a bounded formula, and that they are implied by the original sentences themselves. Hence, by (an obvious extension of) the Soundness Theorem (Arithmetical Version), we infer that
for a suitable closed monotone term q. By (an obvious extension of) Proposition 11, we conclude that
It is clear that ∆ w ⇒ ∆ * ¢ (using the fact that α ≤ β ∧ β ≤ * γ → α ≤ * γ). We are done. P Weak König's lemma provides an instructive case. Kohlenbach showed in [14] that WKL can be replaced by a ∆-sentence, namely (the following is a slight simplification due to Avigad and Feferman in [1] ):
Therefore, one can extract a bound from a proof of a ∀∃ sentence in CT ω + bAC 1,1 0 + WKL, and verify it in CT ω together with the following weakening of WKL:
Observe that this weakening is already provable in CT ω . This is in tune with what was proved in the previous section.
Application: Uniform Boundedness
The Boundedness Principle for type 2 functionals, abbreviated by BF 2 , is the statement
This principle is intuitionistically valid (it is a consequence of the FAN theorem) although it is easily seen to be classically false. In [19] , Kohlenbach considered versions of this principle, and showed that in suitable classical settings with full extensionality certain of its consequences are true (Kohlenbach's result is actually a conservation result of a false theory over a true one).
In the following definition, we consider a very general boundedness principle, and prove a corresponding conservation result. Definition 9 Let τ be an arbitrary type. The Uniform Boundedness Principle for type τ 1 functionals, which we abbreviate by UBF τ 1 , is
where ρ is an arbitrary type and A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (its free variables as displayed), then there is a closed monotone term q 0/1 ρ such that
Observation 7
The theory E-CT ω is the theory CT ω together with full extensionality. Given s and t terms of type ρ := ρ 1 (. . . (ρ k 0) . . .) we say that s = ρ t if ∀y
Full extensionality is the collection of axioms of the form ∀z ρ τ ∀x ρ , y ρ (x = ρ y → zx = τ zy).
Notation 4
The expression x 0/1 means that x can be of type 0 or 1.
Proof. Suppose A := ∀x 0/1 ∃y ρ A 0 (x, y) is a theorem of the theory E-CT ω + bAC
In the presence of full extensionality, UBF τ 1 is a consequence of (actually, it is equivalent to)
To see this, let G 0 (τ 1) and B 0 τ be given functionals. By ( * * ), there is g
By the above, E-CT ω + bAC as λk 0 .G(k,Bk). Fix k 0 and take an arbitrary functional Φ τ . By Lemma 8, min τ (Bk, Φ) ¢ τB k. Thus, G(k, min τ (Bk, Φ)) ¢ 1G (k,Bk). By part (iii) of Lemma 2, we conclude that G(k, min τ (Bk, Φ)) ≤ 1 gk. The claim is proved. Therefore, y) . Now, the Soundness Theorem (Arithmetical Extension) and Proposition 11 yield a closed monotone term q 0/1 ρ such that
By the transitivity of ≤ *
. If the type of x is 1 (the case 0 is even simpler), we infer that
where t := λx.qx M . The conclusion of the theorem follows. P
The above theorem also holds for functionals G of type 0 (τ 0), yielding the so-called UBF τ 0 principles. Plainly, in order to put to use the above theorem one must have interesting functionals G of appropriate type around. This is potentially the case when τ = 1 because the presence of AC 1,0 0 allows one to obtain functionals of type of type 1 0 from quantifier complexes of the form ∀f 1 ∃n 0 . The principle, UBF 1 0 (or UBF 2 ), is:
It is a version of Kohlenbach's principle F:
Kohlenbach's principle is seemingly stronger than UBF 2 , insofar as it guarantees the (uniform) attainment of the maximum by the functional Φ. Yet, we will show in Section 9 that they are equivalent over E-
The Uniform Σ 0 1 -Boundedness Principle, Σ 0 1 -UB for short, also introduced by Kohlenbach in [19] , is
where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula (which may contain parameters of arbitrary type). In [22] , Kohlenbach showed that this false principle implies (even relative to systems as weak as G 2 A ω ) that all functions f from [0, 1] into the real numbers are uniformly continuous (with a modulus of uniform continuity). Therefore, all continuity requirements may be dropped, i.e. functions f from [0, 1] into the real numbers can just be treated as arbitrary functionals of type 1 1 that respect the notion of equality between real numbers. It also allows for particularly simple proofs of We finish this section with a (version of a) result of Kohlenbach. For the connoisseur, it should be noted that the theory T ω in which the verification of the bounding term is made is the same as the underlying theory in the premise, even when the theory is G 2 A ω (compare this with theorem 4.21 of [19] ). Note, however, that our theories have a weaker version bAC 0,1 0 of the quantifier-free axiom of choice AC 0,1 0 (this is no real weakening, except perhaps for G 2 A ω -see the next section).
Refinements
We refine the main theorem of the previous section in two ways. Given f a functional of type 1 and n a number, let f, n be the functional of type 1 that coincides with f for inputs k < 0 n, and is zero for k ≥ 0 n. Formally, λf, n.f, n is a functional of type 1 (0 1).
The next proof relies on an argument of Kohlenbach in [18] :
The theory E-G 2 A ω + AC Proof. By extensionality, it follows that ∀Φ 2 ∀f 1 , g 1 ∃n 0 (∀k < n(f k = 0 gk) → Φ(f ) = 0 Φ(g)).
Fix Φ 2 . It is an easy consequence of AC 1,0 0 that there is µ of type 1 (1 0) such that: ∀f 1 , g 1 (∀k < µf g(f k = 0 gk) → Φ(f ) = 0 Φ(g)).
Fix now f 1 . By BF 2 , there is n 0 such that, ∀g ≤ 1 f (µf g ≤ 0 n).
Therefore, ∀g ≤ 1 f (∀k < n(f k = 0 gk) → Φ(f ) = 0 Φ(g)).
The proposition clearly follows. P
We need to be able to do sequence coding in the proofs of the next two propositions. Hence, we work with the level 3 of the Grzegorczyk's hierarchy:
Proposition 13 E-G 3 A ω + AC Proof. Assume that ∀f 1 ∃g 1 A 0 (f, g). By the previous proposition, this is equivalent to ∀f 1 ∃n 0 A 0 (f, g, n) which, in turn, implies
where s ∈ ω <ω says that s is a (finitely long) sequence of natural numbers. By AC where the above notation means that s is a sequence of length less than ek constituted by elements less than or equal to hk. Clearly, A is a first-order bounded formula and, thence, equivalent to a quantifier-free formula.
Fix k 0 momentarily. The theory E-G 3 A ω has enough induction to show that there is the largest element m k ≤ 0 gk such that A(k, m k ). Therefore: Using the minimization functional µ b (to choose the numerically least s above), it is clear that there is ψ * of type 1 such that ∀k 0 (ψ * k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , hk} <ek ∧ ∀m ≤ 0 gk(A(k, m ) → m ≤ 0 Φ(k, ψ * k)))
It is clear that ψ 0 1 := λk. ψ * k satisfies ∀k 0 ∀f ≤ 1 hk (Φ(k, f ) ≤ 0 Φ(k, ψk)). P Let us refine Theorem 7 again, this time in a direction that is applicable to the theory G 2 A ω as well. In this refinement, the matrix A of the theorem is allowed to be of a more general form:
Definition 10 Let L be the language of arithmetic. We say that a formula is 0-bounded if all its quantifiers are of the form ∀n 0 (n ≤ 0 t → . . .) or ∃n 0 (n ≤ 0 t ∧ . . .), where t is a term of type 0, with parameters of any type, in which the variable n does not occur. A formula is 1-bounded if all its quantifiers are like the quantifiers occurring in the 0-bounded formulas or, else, are of the form ∀f 1 (f ≤ 1 t → . . .) or ∃f 1 (f ≤ 1 t ∧ . . .), where t is a term of type one, with parameters of any type, in which the variable f does not occur.
In order to extend Theorem 7 to 1-bounded matrices, we perform a 'sandwich argument'.
Definition 11
We associate to each 1-bounded formula A of the language L ω ≤ ∀x 0/1 ∃y ρ A 1 (x, y) with A 1 a 1-bounded formula, provided that the verification of the conclusion takes place in E-CT ω , where full extensionality is available (as opposed to plain CT ω ): 
